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CONTEMPLATING THE DILEMMA OF GOVERNMENT
AS SPEAKER: JUDICIALLY IDENTIFIED LIMITS ON
GOVERNMENT SPEECH IN THE CONTEXT OF
CARTER V. CITY OF LAS CRUCES
I. INTRODUCTION
Campaign publicity boldly exhorting "Vote Yes!" for ballot or referendum issues
is a familiar sight in American life during election time. Private groups or individuals
usually sponsor the messages. Less commonly, a governmental entity is behind the
advocacy, using taxpayer money to persuade the electorate to adopt the proposed
measure.
In Carter v. City of Las Cruces,' the plaintiff unsuccessfully sued to enjoin the
City of Las Cruces, New Mexico (Las Cruces or City), and its Commissioners from
using municipal funds to promote a partisan position prior to an election referendum.2
The plaintiff objected to the City's aggressive attempts to gain the voters' approval
for a publicly owned electric utility, 3 asserting that the City's conduct constituted
improper use of public funds and bias for one side of an issue.' The City conducted
a mass media campaign, used public facilities and employees, allegedly registered as
a political action committee, and used over $80,000 in taxpayer funds to promote the
utility acquisition.' The voters approved the bond, allowing the expenditure of
additional millions of dollars from City revenues to carry out the venture.
The legality of the City Commissioner's conduct in Carterremains unresolved.7
1. 121 N.M. 580, 915 P.2d 336 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 121 N.M. 644,916 P.2d 844 (1996).
2. See id. at 582-83, 915 P.2d at 337. The New Mexico Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court
for it to determine whether the action could proceed under section 1983 of the federal Civil Rights Act as a violation
of constitutional rights under color of state law. See id. The state law injunctive relief request became moot because
the election occurred before the court of appeals heard the case. See id.
3. According the advertisements of the City of Las Cruces (Las Cruces or City), El Paso Electric, the
company that formerly operated utilities in Las Cruces, had been charging Las Cruces utility customers some of the
highest rates in the nation and had refused to negotiate with the city to lower the rates. See Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, Exhibit D at 000026, Carter v. City of Las Cruces, 121 N.M. 580, 915
P.2d 336 (Ct. App.) (No. CV-94-605), cert. denied, 121 N.M. 644,916 P.2d 844 (1996). Furthermore, the company
which acquired El Paso Electric, after El Paso Electric went bankrupt, allegedly announced an increase in rates
effective the beginning of 1995, according to the City's advertisements. See id.; see also infra note 214.
4. See Carter, 121 N.M. at 581,915 P.2d at 337.
5. See Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, Exhibit I at 000045, Carter,121
N.M. 580, 915 P.2d 336.
6. See Cruces Dumps Electric Co., Voters in Las Cruces, N.M., Choose to Dump Company In Favor of
Municipal Utility, ALBUQUERQUE JOURNAL, Aug. 31, 1994, at Al, available in WESTLAW, Albuqjnl database or
Allnewsplus database, 1994 WL 13775227.
7. See supra note 2. In Carter,the New Mexico Court of Appeals acknowledged that there is some authority
for finding that the City Commissioners' conduct was illegal, and that "at some threshold level, a public entity must
refrain from spending public funds to promote a partisan position during an election campaign." Carter, 121 N.M.
at 583, 915 P.2d at 339. The plaintiffs originally sued in federal court. See id. at 581, 915 P.2d at 337. Judge Parker
of the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, in this companion case to the Carter case before
the New Mexico Court of Appeals, observed that constitutional problems may arise
where governments and governmental employees go beyond either, one, providing neutral
information about issues on a ballot or, two, expressing personal views on election issues, as any
citizen has the right to do undei- the First Amendment, going beyond that to the point of using
public funds derived in part from taxes paid by those holding opposing views to advocate how the
county electorate should vote on the election issue.
Id. at 583, 915 P.2d at 339 (quoting Judge Parker, United States District Court, District of New Mexico in a
companion case to Carter,without citation); see Motions Hearing at 9-10, Carter v. City of Las Cruces (D.N.M. Aug.
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Neither the United States Supreme Court nor New Mexico courts have addressed the
precise issue of "government speech," the shorthand that courts and commentators
use to identify partisan campaign messages sponsored by the government.8
Jurisdictions that have addressed this issue reveal an almost "uniform judicial
reluctance" to sanction these types of government expenditures,9 applying the
premise that partisan campaigning by governmental entities is antithetical to
democratic values.10
These jurisdictions have reached the almost uniform consensus that, in the context
of an election, messages from the government may inform but they may not directly
persuade."l Judicial opinions attempting to identify impermissible government speech
seek to distinguish between education and advocacy.' 2 These opinions reveal the
commonly held view that although official speech is necessary for governing and
education, governmental entities overreach when their communications become
coercive or propagandistic during an election. 3 However, court decisions which
address the government speech issue fail to fully explain how government partisan
advocacy distorts the political process.'4 In addition, courts often base their rulings

23, 1994) (No. CV 94-0942) (original source of Judge Parker's quotation); see also Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, Exhibit B at 000124-000125, Carter v. City of Las Cruces, 121 N.M.
580,915 P.2d 336 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 121 N.M. 644, 916 P.2d 844 (1996). Judge Parker also found that there
was some law supporting the plaintiffs' constitutional claims in the case before him. See Motions Hearing at 10,
Carter v. City of Las Cruces (D.N.M. Aug. 23, 1994) (No. CV 94-0942) (original source of Judge Parker's quotation);
see also Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, Exhibit B at 000125, Carter v. City
of Las Cruces, 121 N.M. 580, 915 P.2d 336 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 121 N.M. 644, 916 P.2d 844 (1996).
8. See, e.g., Burt v. Blumenauer, 699 P.2d 168, 172 (Or. 1985) (en banc); Frederick Schauer, Is Government
Speech a Problem? 35 STAN. L. REV. 373 (1983) (reviewing MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS:
POLITICS, LAw, AND GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION INAMERICA (1983)); Edward H. Ziegler, Jr., Government Speech
and the Constitution: The Limits of Official Partisanship, 21 B.C. L. REV. 578 (1980).
9. See Burt, 699 P.2d at 172 (There exists a "uniform judicial reluctance to sanction the use of public funds
for election campaigns.") (citing Stanson v. Mott, 551 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1976) (en banc)).
10. See, e.g., District of Columbia Common Cause v. District of Columbia, 858 F.2d I (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(prohibiting the District of Columbia from expending funds to oppose a citizen initiative on the upcoming ballot);
Mountain States Legal Found. v. Denver Sch. Dist. No. 1, 459 F. Supp. 357 (D. Colo. 1978) (enjoining a school
board's expenditures used to urge voters to reject an upcoming state constitutional amendment because the
expenditures were contrary to state law and the federal Constitution); Stanson, 551 P.2d 1 (finding that the state parks
department impermissibly expended public funds to support a park bond issue); Miller v. California Comm'n on the
Status of Women, 198 Cal. Rptr. 877 (Ct. App. 1984) (finding that the expenditures made by state commission
advocating women's equal rights were legal because they were not made before an election); Burt, 699 P.2d 168
(declaring that the public health department's partisan expenditures were invalid because the pertinent state statute
evidenced a general legislative intent to prohibit the expenditures); Anderson v. City of Boston, 380 N.E.2d 628
(Mass. 1978) (enjoining a municipality's attempt to use taxpayer funds to wage a campaign against a state
constitutional amendment concerning taxation), stayed by, City of Boston v. Anderson, 439 U.S. 1389, (Brennan,
J., as Circuit Justice), affd mem, 439 U.S. 951 (1978) (motion to vacate stay order denied); Stem v. Kramarsky, 375
N.Y.S.2d 235 (Sup. Ct. 1975) (declaring that expenditures directed at the outcome of an election could never be
authorized). But see Alabama Libertarian Party v. City of Birmingham, 694 F. Supp. 814 (N.D. Ala. 1988) (upholding
the city's expenditures because they were incident to the city's duties to protect the public's welfare); City Affairs
Comm'n of Jersey City v. Board of Comm'rs of Jersey City, 46 A.2d 425 (N.J. 1946) (finding that the county
commissioners lawfully expended public monies because a municipality may properly spend taxpayer funds to
promote a public purpose).
11. See, e.g., supra note 10 and cases cited therein.
12. See, e.g., supra note 10 and cases cited therein.
13. See, e.g., supra note 10 and cases cited therein.
14. See Charles E. Ryan, Municipal Free Speech: Banned In Boston?, 47 FORDHAM L. REV. 1111, 1129
(1979) ("The [Elsenau v. City of Chicago, 165 N.E. 129 (l. 1929),] decision simply avoided any analysis of the
manner in which the city's action distorted the role of government."); see alsoAnderson, 380 N.E.2d at 633 (taking
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on state political campaign statutes which do not plainly apply to political advertising
campaigns of government subdivisions. 5
This Comment will describe the judicially created limits on government speech
and the ways in which government partisan advocacy perverts the political process.
Part II describes the analysis that state courts normally apply to evaluate the
permissibility of government speech. Part II examines the theoretical and
constitutional concerns that arise in these situations. Part IV considers the
government's right and responsibility to provide information. Part V discusses
whether government speech poses a real problem and evaluates the general rule that
courts apply to government speech cases. Part VI concludes that governmental
speech has both negative and positive implications for the integrity of our democratic
process.
II. THE PROBLEM ADDRESSED UNDER STATE LAW
When confronting the issue of government partisan advocacy, courts have focused
on whether the governmental entity acted within its grant of legislative authority.
These courts have almost uniformly invalidated the types of campaign expenditures
found in Carter.6 For instance, in Burt v. Blumenauer,17 the Oregon Supreme Court
confronted a situation similar to Carterand inquired whether there was legislative
authority for the expenditure."8 Under this common analysis, if authority exists under
an agency or subdivision's statutory mandate, then the court evaluates whether
another statute preempts that authority. 9 If the expenditure overcomes both of these
hurdles, the court then determines whether the expenditure violates the state or
federal Constitution.'
The Analysis Applied to Entities Operating Under State Statutes
When determining whether agency authority exists, courts either find no authority
or focus on whether another state statute preempts the authority claimed under a
general authorizing provision. For instance, the court in Burt v. Blumenauer
examined Oregon's statutes to determine whether they preempted the health
department's claimed authority.2 The court applied statutes that prohibited public
employees from opposing the adoption of a measure during working hours and
concluded that the statute invalidated the department's implied authority in public
A.

judicial notice that traditionally municipalities have not appropriated funds to influence election results); Burt, 699
P.2d at 172 ("Some recent state cases deserve attention, as much as for what they fall to say as for what they say.");
JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTrruTIONAL LAW § 16.11, at 1003 (5th ed. 1995).
15.

See infra Part B.C.

16. See Burt, 699 P.2d at 174 ("Mhe cases come to uniform results."); Ziegler, supra note 8, at 586-87; Ryan,
supra note 14, at 1111; see also supra note 10 and cases cited therein.
17. 699 P.2d 168.
18. See id. at 179.
19. See Mountain States Legal Found. v. Denver Sch. Dist. No. 1,459 F. Supp. 347 (D. Colo. 1978); Miller
v. California Comm'n on the Status of Women, 198 Cal. Rptr. 877 (Ct. App. 1984); Mines v. Del Valle, 257 P. 530
(Cal. 1927), overruled byStanson v. Mort, 551 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1976) (en banc); Citizens to Protect Pub. Funds v. Board
of Educ. of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 98 A.2d 673 (N.J. 1953).
20. See Burt, 699 P.2d at 179, 181 app.; see also Ziegler, supra note 8, at 589.
21. See Burt, 699 P.2d at 179.
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health matters.Y The result of this type of inquiry is that, in the absence of express
legislative authorization, most courts limit government speech during an election to
neutral informational messages.2
In Stanson v. Mott,4 the California Supreme Court initially found that the state
parks department had the authority to disseminate information about park bond
issues. 25 However, the court limited the department's campaign activities to
informational messages and declared that the entity's advertising campaign was
improper.'s The court acknowledged that the parks department could expend money
on disseminating neutral information that was relevant to its purpose.27 The court
then explained the difference between neutral information and promotional
messages.28
B.

The Analysis Applied to Home Rule Municipalities
Unlike governmental entities operating entirely under the authority of state law,
local governments operating under home rule charters may take any fiscal action that
does not expressly conflict with other legislation. Home rule is a state statutory or
constitutional grant of general self-government power to a municipality. 29 The
essence of home rule power is that municipalities can determine the powers and
functions of their local governments with more freedom from state legislative
control? 0 Home rule legislation usually permits a municipality to appropriate funds
for purposes which are not explicitly stated in the legislative grant of power.3' Only
the Constitution and conflicting legislation potentially limit these appropriations.32
Despite the broad grant of power found in home rule charters, courts continue to
assume that government speech which is directed at an election is impermissible. In
Anderson v. City of Boston,3 the City of Boston, Massachusetts (Boston), which had
a home rule statute similar to the one in Las Cruces,' argued that its broad home rule

22. See id. at 180 (citing OR. REV. STAT. §§ 250.432 (1), 260.432(2) (1991)). The Oregon statutes at issue
also prohibited public officials from requiring their employees to participate in elections. See Burt, 699 P.2d at 180.
23. See Mountain States, 459 F. at 360 ("If it is assumed that the board of education has the power to spend

public funds and use public facilities for the purpose of informing the electorate about this issue, there is strong
precedent for requiring fairness and neutrality in that effort."); Citizens to Protect Public Funds, 98 A.2d at 677
("Mhe use of the funds to finance not the presentation of facts merely but also arguments to persuade the voters that
only one side has merit, gives the dissenters just cause for complaint. The expenditure is then not within the implied
power and is not lawful in the absence of express authority from the Legislature.").
24. 551 P.2d I (Cal. 1976) (en banc).
25. See id.

26. See id. at I1.
27. See id.
28. See id.

29. See NEw MEXICO MuNIcIPAL LEAGUE, HOME RuLE MANUAL FOR NEw MEXICO MUNICIPALITIES 1 (Oct.
1976).

30.
31.
32.
33.

See Zeigler, supra note 8, at 602.
See id.
See id.
380 N.E.2d 628 (Mass. 1978), stayed by, City of Boston v. Anderson, 439 U.S. 1389, (Brennan, J., as

Circuit Justice), affd mem., 439 U.S. 951 (1978) (motion to vacate stay order denied).
34. See id. at 632 (citing MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 89, § 7 (1975)). The Massachusetts general statutes define
a home rule municipality's powers as the ability of a municipality to "exercise any power or function which the
general court has power to confer upon it, which is not inconsistent with the constitution or laws enacted by the
general court in conformity with powers reserved to the general court ....
See id. at 633. The New Mexico

Summer 1997]

CARTER V. CITY OF LAS CRUCES

authority justified its advocacy.35 Boston had sought to expend municipal funds to
urge its inhabitants to vote for a proposed amendment to the state constitution.36 Even
though home rule reverses the presumption that an entity must have express
authorization to make an expenditure, in Anderson the Massachusetts Supreme Court
considered the expenditures inconsistent with a municipality's traditional role.37
C. Statutory Law as Evidence of Legislative Intent to ProhibitGovernment
PartisanAdvocacy
Although the Anderson court agreed that Boston's home rule ordinance permitted
Boston to spend funds not specifically prohibited by the Massachusetts Legislature,
the court found that the expenditures were improper under the state campaign
disclosure statutes.38 Without expressly mentioning municipalities, Massachusetts'
state campaign disclosure statutes regulate campaign expenditures and contributions
and impose disclosure requirements on political activities by organizations,
associations, and other groups, that promote or oppose questions submitted to the
voters.39 The purpose of these statutes is to promote citizen confidence and
participation in the electoral process by curbing corporate expenditures.' The statutes
presume that wealthy and powerful corporations unduly influence the electoral
process because their views may drown out other voices.
The defendants in Anderson argued that the absence of statutory language
referring to municipalities or other government subdivisions indicated that the state
campaign disclosure statutes did not apply to municipal campaign activities.41 The
Anderson court disagreed.42 The court viewed the statute as preempting any claimed
right to spend public funds. 43 According to the court, the state legislature's failure to
mention municipalities in its disclosure requirements was evidence that "the
Legislature did not even contemplate such municipal action could occur." For
support for its conclusion that the state statutes applied to municipalities, the
Anderson court relied on campaign statutes regulating the participation of municipal

Constitution's home rule amendment provides, in pertinent part: "The registered qualified electors of a municipality
may adopt, amend or repeal a charter in the manner provided by law." N.M. CONST. art. X, § 6(C). The New Mexico
Constitution further provides:
A municipality which adopts a charter may exercise all legislative powers and perform all
functions not expressly denied by general law or charter ....No tax imposed by the governing
body of a charter municipality, except a tax authorized by general law, shall become effective until
approved by a majority vote in the charter municipality.
N.M. CONST. art. X, § 6(D).

35. See Anderson, 380 N.E.2d at 632. In Carterv. City of Las Cruces, Las Cruces also asserted that it could
do anything not expressly prohibited by law or the Constitution. See Transcript of Proceedings at 37, Carter v. City
of Las Cruces, 121 N.M. 580, 915 P.2d 336 (Ct. App. 1996) (No. CV-94-605).
36. See Anderson, 380 N.E.2d at 631.
37. See id. at 634 ("We notice judicially that traditionally municipalities have not appropriated funds to
influence election results. If the Legislature had expected that municipalities would engage in such activities or
intended that they could [the statute] would have regulated those activities as well.").
38. See id.at 633-34.
39. See id. at 633 (citing MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 55, § 1 (1975)).
40. See id. at 633-43 (citing MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 55, § 1 (1975)).
41. See id. at 633.
42. See id.
43. See id.at 633-34.
44. Id. at 634.
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employees in campaigns, 45 which implied a legislative intent to "keep political fund
raising and disbursing out of the hands of nonelective public employees and out of
city and town halls." '6 In addition, the Anderson court extended the state campaign
statutes' rationale to situations where a government organizes its own campaign to
persuade the voters.47
Governmental advocacy cases, including Carter,involve the unique situation of
a public entity campaigning for its position on an election issue.48 In a similar
context, courts have applied election laws to restrict the political campaign activities
of certain classes of public employees.49 In these cases, courts have inferred a general
legislative intent to prohibit expenditures for partisan advocacy, even though the
statutes that are used to invalidate the government's actions apply only indirectly.50
This raises the question of whether any expenditures on partisan advocacy could ever
satisfy the a court as proper.
Courts inquire whether authority exists for two explicit reasons. First, courts avoid
deciding questions under the federal Constitution if the issue can be resolved on state
law grounds.5' Second, when a government agency or subdivision is created by
statute, the entity must act within its legislative grant of authority. 52 As a result,
government officials who hold money in trust for the taxpayers may appropriate

45. See id. at 633-34. The Burt v. Blummenauer court also found that a statute prohibiting government
employees from participating in elections invalidated governmental campaign expenditures. See Burt v. Blumenauer,
699 P.2d 168 (Or. 1985) (en banc). The Oregon election finance law applied by the Burt court prohibited public
employees from engaging in political activities while working and also prohibited "the solicitation of public employees
for political activity." Burt, 699 P.2d at 180 (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 250.432(l)(1991)). This statute provides in
relevant part that "[n]o person shall attempt to, or actually, ***require a public employee to ***give ***service ***
to *** oppose ***the adoption of a measure ***." Burt, 699 P.2d at 180 (quoting OR. REv. STAT. § 250.432(1)
(1991)).
Compare Burt to section 10-9-21(F) of the New Mexico Statutes, which states that "[n]o employee or probationer
shall engage in partisan political activity while on duty." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 10-9-21(F) (Repl. Pamp. 1995). This
section applies to state employees. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 10-9-4 (Repl. Pamp. 1995); see also N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§ 10-9-1 through 10-9-25 (Repl. Pamp. 1995).
The Municipal Code of the City of Las Cruces, New Mexico, states:
(1)No city employee shall hold a political position or engage in political activity which is
incompatible or in conflict with his/her city employment; (2) No city employee shall participate
in political or electoral issues during regular working hours; (3) No city employee shall use his/her
position or the prestige of his/her office either direct or implied, to influence others for political
purposes; (4) City employees shall not be coerced to support or oppose any political or electoral
issue or candidate for public office, during regular work hours or while in the performance of
his/her duties.
LAS CRUCES, N.M., MUNICIPAL CODE, § 24-211 (1996).
46. Anderson, 380 N.E. at 634.
47. See id.
48. See Ryan, supra note 14, at 1133 n.176.
49. See Stanson v. Mott, 551 P.2d I (Cal. 1976) (en banc); Citizens to Protect Pub. Funds v. Board of Educ.
of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 98 A.2d 673 (N.J. 1953); Ziegler, supra note 8, at 592 ("[T]hese statutes are directed
primarily toward restricting the political activities of civil service employees in campaigns involving political
parties.").
50. See Mountain States Legal Found. v. Denver Sch. Dist. No. 1,459 F. Supp 357, 359 (D.C. Cir. 1978);
Burt v. Blumenauer, 699 P.2d 168, 180-81 (Or. 1985) (en banc); Anderson v. City of Boston, 380 N.E.2d 628, 63334 (Mass. 1978), stayed by, City of Boston v. Anderson, 439 U.S. 1389, (Brennan, J., as Circuit Justice), affid mem.,
439 U.S. 951 (1978) (motion to vacate stay order denied).
51. See, e.g., Stover v. Journal Publ'g Co., 105 N.M. 291, 297, 731 P.2d 1335, 1441 (Ct. App. 1985) ("Courts
will not decide constitutional questions unless necessary to the disposition of the case.").
52. See Stanson, 551 P.2d at 8.
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funds only if the law provides for this action. 3 On the other hand, municipalities and
state agencies have a great amount of leeway to expand their powers. For instance,
home rule statutes purport to grant municipalities broad powers 5 and in the case of
agencies, legislatures often state broad policy objectives and allow an agency to
determine how to implement the policy." The scope of authority of government
agencies also may be of particular concern because their officials are appointed and
not directly accountable to the voters. Perhaps courts also focus on whether authority
exists, in the absence of clear legislation addressing government speech, as a device
to reach their almost preordained conclusion that government advocacy before an
election is "inherently unjustified. 56
I.

THE PROBLEM ADDRESSED UNDER REPUBLICAN AND
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES
speech
poses additional problems because "many of its features go
Government
to the heart of democratic theory. The legitimacy of government depends on the
consent of the governed, but that consent is influenced, and indeed, sometimes
manipulated, by the government itself. 5' Thus, government speech raises special
concerns that are absent when a public entity exceeds its authority in non-speech
contexts.
A.

"Manufacturingthe Consent of the Governed"
Government attempts to influence the result of an election may control and
interfere with the political process. Courts have dubbed government speech on
election issues "propaganda."58 At least one court has considered it equivalent to
"manufactur[ing] the consent of the governed." 9 While government by consent
requires the free exchange of information, government speech in any form involves
influencing the electorate. The Framers of the Constitution viewed government
influence on the views of its citizens as a potential threat' 6to democracy, because it
could prevent the formation of "genuine citizen opinion. 0

53. See Ziegler, supra note 8, at 586-87.
54. For a discussion of home nile municipalities, see supra Part II.B.
55. See Ziegler, supra note 8, at 580.
56. See Ryan, supra note 14, at 1129 ("[T]he (Elsenau v. City of Chicago, 165 N.E. 129 (M. 1929)] court
focused almost exclusively on the inherent limitations of municipal power .... ).
57. LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTTrnONAL LAW § 12-4, at 810 n.19 (2d ed. 1988) (citing Mark
V. Tushnet, Talking to Each Other: Reflections on Yudofs WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS, I Wis. L REv. 129 (1984)
(book review)).
58. "Propaganda" has been defined as "[o]fficial government communications to the public that are designed
to influence opinion. The information may be true or false, but it is always carefully selected for its political effect."
E.D. HIRSCH, JR., ET AL., THE DICTIONARY OF CULTURAL LITERACY 301 (1988).

59. Burt v. Blumenauer, 699 P.2d 168, 175 (Or. 1985) (en banc) ("(E]xcessive or questionable efforts by
government to manufacture the consent of the governed calls the legitimacy of its action into question.").
60. Ziegler, supra note 8, at 578-79. In 1801, President Jefferson wrote that "it is expected that [a government
official] will not attempt to influence the votes of others nor take any part in the business of electioneering, that being
deemed inconsistent with the spirit of the Constitution and his duties to it." Ziegler, supra note 8. at 579 n.3 (quoting
I JAMES D. RICHARDSON, A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789-1897, at 98-99
(1899)). As the California Supreme Court stated in Stanson v. Mott:
A fundamental precept of this nation's democratic electoral process is that the government may
not "take sides" in election contests or bestow an unfair advantage on one of several competing
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Arguably, the least threatening form of government speech is where government
entities advocate for their own measures. Nonetheless, most jurisdictions that have
addressed this issue have declared government speech invalid in an election context
where the promotional activities were incident to management duties. For example,
in Mines v. Del Valle, an early case involving expenditures by an agency to promote
a bond issue, the Public Service Commission of Los Angeles, California
(Commission), tried to convince voters to approve a bond measure to finance the
expansion of its power plant.6 The Commission claimed that the Los Angeles City
Charter provisions which governed the general management of power plants
provided the authority for it to promote its bond measure.62 One of the provisions
' The Mines court
authorized the Commissioners "to 'extend' electric plant[s." 63
declared that Los Angeles could use the money in furtherance of its statutory mandate
to administer power plants, but only after the money was appropriated and put into
the general fund."
In Stanson v. Mott,65 a case occurring a half century later and which overruled
Mines, the California Department of Parks and Recreation claimed it was engaging
in "advanced planning" that was mandated by statute when it promoted the passage
of a park bond issue.' The court declined to allow partisan speech made for the
interest of advanced planning without explicit legislative authorization.6 7
In Burt v. Blumenauer,the Oregon Supreme Court also found that a governmental
agency's use of taxpayer funds to promote a policy germane to that agency's purpose
was improper without public approval.68 In Burt, the court rejected the claim of the
defendants (a county health officer and other officials) that the county's duty to
promote the public health justified their expenditures of public monies. 69 The health
department used taxpayer funds to engage in an aggressive advertising campaign to
support an antifluoridation policy, entitled a "fluoridation public information
project," using public employees and the broadcast media.7" The plaintiff contended
that county officials could not use public monies to promote one side of an issue

factions. A principal danger feared by our country's founders lay in the possibility that the holders
of governmental authority would use official power improperly to perpetuate themselves, or their
allies, in office ....
The selective use of public funds in election campaigns, of course, raises the
specter of just such an improper distortion of the democratic electoral process.
Stanson v. Mott, 551 P.2d 1,9 (Cal. 1976) (en banc).
61. See Mines v. Del Valle, 257 P. 530,532 (Cal. 1927), overruledby Stanson, 551 P.2d 1. The facts of Mines
are similar to the facts of Carter.In Mines, the Public Service Commission of Los Angeles, California (Commission),
engaged in extensive promotional activities, such as constructing floats and printing banners and newspaper
advertisements, to urge voters to approve a $35,000,000 bond for providing electricity to Los Angeles residents. See
id. at 532. The Commission allegedly spent over $12,000 on the campaign. See id.
62. See id.
63. Id. at 535.
64. See id. at 536.
65. 551 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1976) (en banc).
66. See id. at 6.
67. See id.; see also id. at 10 (stating that express legislative authorization could raise serious constitutional
problems).
68. See Burt v. Blumenauer, 699 P.2d 168 (Or. 1985) (en banc).
69. See id. at 179-80.
70. See id.
at 168-69.
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before the voters.7' The Oregon Supreme Court invalidated the expenditure! 2 The
court stated that while educating the public about health matters is part of the
agency's duties, a governmental entity impermissibly augments its power when it
promotes a policy rather than presents facts for the citizens to make their own
decisions.73 According to the Burt court, this sort of advocacy was aimed
inappropriately at getting the public to comply with the agency's chosen measures.74
B.

MaintainingGovernmental Hierarchy
The federal district court in Mountain States Legal Foundationv. Denver School
DistrictNo. I 5 and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Campbell v. Joint District
28-J"6 based their government speech decisions on the proper place of a subdivision
among the state power scheme, but still emphasized a citizen's right to participate in
an unbiased process even when an agency is promoting the public welfare.77 In the
first dispute, the Denver School Board claimed that Colorado law, specifically
section 1-45-116 of the Colorado Campaign Reform Act (Reform Act),7" vested it
with the authority to make the challenged expenditures.79 The language of the Reform
Act allowed the state, its agencies, or political subdivisions to make campaign
contributions to support issues in which they have an "official concern."'' The school
board argued that a proposed constitutional amendment, which would limit methods
for increasing taxes, was an official concern for government bodies that depend on
taxes to operate. 81
In response, the district court in Mountain States reasoned that if the school board
could decide for itself the matters for which it had an "official concern," the board
would have unlimited discretion in using its funds and facilities.8 2 The court viewed
the school board as meddling in the affairs of the entire state.83 The court stated that

71. See id. at
72. See id. at
73. See id. at
matters of health...

170.
179.
179-80. "There may be a question about whether authority to motivate individual behavior in
extends to persuading the public to support a chosen government policy." Id. at 180.

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

See id. at 175-76.
459 F. Supp. 357 (D.Colo. 1978).
704 F.2d 501 (10th Cir. 1983).
See Mountain States, 459 F. Supp. at 360.
The Colorado Campaign Reform Act provides:
State and political subdivisions-limitations on contributions. (1) No agency, department, board,
division, bureau, commission, or council of the state or any political subdivision thereof shall
make any contribution or contribution in kind in campaigns involving the nomination, retention,
or election of any person to any public office. They may, however, make contributions or
contributions in kind in campaigns involving only issues in which they have an official concern.
Mountain States, 459 F. Supp. at 360 (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-45-116 (1973) (current version as amended at
COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-45-117 (1997))).

79. See Campbell, 704 F.2d at 503.
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. See Mountain States, 459 F. Supp at 359.
83. See id. But see Alabama Libertarian Party v. City of Birmingham, 694 F. Supp 814 (N.D. Ala. 1988); City
Affairs Comm'n of Jersey City v. Board of Comm'rs of Jersey City, 46 A.2d 425, 427 (N.J. 1946). In City Affairs,
the court recognized that a subdivision of the state has a right to "self-advancement and self-protection," considering
partisan advocacy on the issue of adoption of a constitutional amendment to be a "reasonable and legitimate means"
of exercising its power. City Affairs, 46 A.2d at 427. The court also stated that "[tihe right of advocacy and defense
of the communal welfare in the state legislative forum has long been accorded general recognition." Id. at 426.
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significant change in the state system which the amendment could bring was not the
concern of one unit of government." This would "distort the relationship of
governmental agencies to the people who are to be served by them.""5
The district court in Mountain States left open the possibility that some
expenditures, such as those on government speech concerning school bond issues,
would be appropriate as part of the board's official concern. 6 However, the school
87
board could not take sides, and would have to use "fairness and neutrality. The
district court based the requirement of impartiality on principles found in the federal
Constitution, such as the First Amendment and the section 4, Article IV guarantee
8
clause, and on James Madison's writings in The Federalistpapers.
In Campbell v. Joint District28-J, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's
89
holding, but stated that the constitutional questions were unnecessary to its decision.
It found that the matter was not an "official concern," and therefore the school
board's expenditures were improper, because "[h]ere a change in the tax scheme
would not cross [the school board's] desk[] for approval."' Concern for fairness to
subdivisions of the state, the proper place of an agency within the state power
scheme, as well as the board's obligation to remain impartial, formed the basis of the
Tenth Circuit's rationale. 91
In contrast to the court decisions discussed above, the federal district court in
Alabama LibertarianParty v. City of Birmingham92 held that situations where an
entity advocates the passage of its own proposals are not only consistent with its role,
but that it is also part of its duty to raise the funds necessary to meet the needs of its
citizens. 93 The City of Birmingham (Birmingham) urged the passage of a bond to
provide funds for several public projects ranging from museums to sewers.' The
court stated that the Birmingham may make expenditures to solicit the passage of its
own proposals if it cannot directly tax through ordinance. 95 The court ruled that the
advertising campaign was incident to the Birmingham's obligation "to determine the
needs of its citizens and to provide funds to service those needs." 9

84. See Mountain States, 459 F. Supp. at 359.
85. Id.
86. See id. at 360.
87. See id.
88. See id. at 361 (citing Kohler v. Tugwell, 292 F. Supp. 978, 984 (E.D. La. 1968) (Wisdom, J., concurring),
affid per curiam, 393 U.S. 531 (1969), and THE FEDERALIST No. 49 (James Madison)).
89. See Campbell v. Joint Dist. 28-J, 704 F.2d 501, 505 (10th Cir. 1983).
90. Id. The Tenth Circuit further stated that "[the school board] expended public monies and made in-kind
contributions in an area which is beyond anything which they could decide in their representative roles." Id.
91. See id.
92. 694 F. Supp. 814 (N.D. Ala. 1988).
93. See id at 817; see also supra note 83 (discussion of City Affairs Commission of Jersey City v. Board of
Commissionersof Jersey City, 46 A.2d 425 (N.J. 1946)).

94. See Alabama Libertarian,694 F. Supp. at 815 n.2.
95. See id. at 817-18.
96. Id. at 817.
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Government Speech that Thwarts the Exercise of the ElectoralFranchise

1. Changes in Organic Law
Although the Alabama Libertariancourt upheld a city's advocation of passage of
a bond to fund public projects, the Alabama Libertariancourt did acknowledge that
where the election concerned a constitutional amendment, the governmental entity's
campaign expenditures may impermissibly interfere with the political process.' The
Alabama Libertariancourt specifically noted that Mountain States and Campbell
involved an amendment to the state constitution.98 Although the proposed
amendment in Mountain States only indirectly related to public schools, it would
have changed the way that governmental members could spend public funds,"
ultimately restricting the representative government's authority if passed."° The
Mountain States court considered the constitutional amendment to be "an organic
systemic change in governance of the people,"'' necessitating the people, as
sovereign, to approve the amendment.10 2
2. Government Speech Opposing Citizen Initiatives and the First Amendment
Right to Petition
The federal district court in Mountain States stated in dicta that the defendant's
campaign violated the First Amendment right to petition."13 Parties who challenged
the school board's expenditures had originally signed petitions to place the proposed
amendment on the ballot.' ° Citizen petitions, which carry a required number of
signatures, allow the public to initiate changes in law by filing petitions to be
approved by the legislature or the electorate.0 5 The district court considered the
school board's speech in opposition to this initiative to be an infringement on the
people's right to petition, even though violations of the right to petition usually
involve direct governmental suppression of that right.'0

97. See id. at 820.
98. See id. (citing Mountain States Legal Found. v. Denver Sch. Dist. No. 1,459 F. Supp. 357 (D. Colo. 1978)
and Campbell v. Joint Dist. 28-J, 704 F.2d 501 (10th Cir. 1983)).
99. See Campbell, 704 F.2d at 501. The proposed amendment was entitled "An Amendment Adding a New
Section 21 to Article X of the Constitution of the State of Colorado Requiring Registered Elector Approval of All
State and Local Executive or Legislative Acts Which Result in New or Increased Taxes." Id.
100. See Mountain States, 459 F. Supp. at 360.
101. Id. at 359. In a companion case, the district court stated that the proposed amendment would work a
"revolutionary change in the... functioning of all governmental activities in Colorado." See Campbell, 704 F.2d at
505 (quoting Campbell v. Arapahoe County Sch. Dist. #6, 90 F.R.D. 189, 193 (D. Colo. 1981)).
102. See id.
103. See id. at 360. The First Amendment's last clause states that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging
... the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S.
CONST. amend. I.
104. See Campbell, 704 F.2d at 502.
105. A citizen initiative is "[a]n electoral process whereby designated percentages of the electorate may initiate
legislative or constitutional changes through the filing of formal petitions to be acted on by the legislature or the total
electorate." Alabama Libertarian Party v. City of Birmingham, 694 F. Supp. 814, 819 (N.D. Ala. 1988) (quoting
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 705 (5th ed. 1979)).

106. See Mountain States, 459 F. Supp. at 360. Abolitionists during the Civil War first used the First
Amendment's petition clause to challenge a gag rule that suppressed citizen petitions regarding the abolition of
slavery. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 14, § 16.53, at 1188; see generally Norman B. Smith, "Shall Make No
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In District of Columbia Common Cause v. Districtof Columbia,"' the federal
district court also based its decision to invalidate government speech expenditures on
the First Amendment right to petition.' In this case, the plaintiffs challenged the
District of Columbia's efforts to persuade voters to reject a measure that required the
city to provide overnight shelter for all homeless people who requested it."' 9 The
plaintiffs alleged that their challenge vindicated their "direct interest in maintaining
the integrity of the initiative and referendum process in the District of
Columbia. ... ""0 The district court agreed, but based its holding on a congressional
appropriations statute.' which expressly forbade the use of publicity or propaganda
for purposes of influencing legislation." 2
In the citizen's initiative context, government speech potentially distorts the right
to participate in the political process at two stages: the people's right to participate
when they go to the polls, and the people's right to directly participate in the process
by initiating the measure. In Mountain States and Common Cause, the district courts
considered publicly financed opposition to measures initiated by the people to be a
serious infringement on the right to participate in self-government." 3 Both courts
considered these actions to interfere with the people's exercise of their initiative
power under the federal and state Constitutions."" Although advertising in opposition
to a citizen initiative does not directly suppress citizen rights, using public funds to
mount a campaign was found by the Mountain States court to undermine the
"political freedom" of the voters, shifting power away from the people at an integral
and influential stage of the process." 5
D. Government Speech, the FirstAmendment Right ofAssociation, and
Compelled Expression Concerns
The Alabama Libertariancourt's holding can be distinguished from other cases
not only for its finding in favor of the governmental entity involved, but also because
the holding was founded solely on the federal Constitution. Other courts found a6
statutory basis for their decisions, using constitutional principles only for support."

Law Abridging": An Analysis of the Neglected, But Nearly Absolute, Right of Petition, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 1153
(1986).
107. 858 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
108. See id.
109. See Alabama Libertarian,694 F. Supp at 818 (citing Common Cause, 858 F.2d at 1).
110. See Common Cause, 858 F.2d at 2 (quoting Plaintiff's Complaint at para. 6).
111. See id. at I1 (quoting D.C. CODE ANN. § 47-304 (1987) (In the District of Columbia, all monetary
expenditures must be approved by the express provisions of a congressional act.)).
112. See id. The federal statute governing congressional appropriations stated that "[n]o part of this
appropriation shall be used for publicity or propaganda purposes or implementation of any policy including boycott
designed to support or defeat legislation pending before Congress or any State legislature." Id. (quoting H.R. 5899,
98th Cong. § 117 (1984) (enacted)).
113. See id. at 3; Mountain States Legal Found. v. Denver Sch. Dist. No. 1, 459 F. Supp. 357, 358 (D. Colo.
1978).
114. See Common Cause, 858 F.2d at 3; Mountain States, 459 F. Supp. at 358.
115. See Mountain States, 459 F. Supp. at 360.
116. SeeAlabamaLibertarianPartyv. City of Birmingham, 694 F. Supp. 814, 821 (N.D. Al& 1988). The court
stated that the Colorado court's decision in Mountain States was at least partially based on a Colorado statute, making
"no obviously clear First Amendment decision." Id.; see Mountain States, 459 F. Supp. at 359. The Alabama
Libertariancourt further noted that the Common Cause court found a statutory basis for its decision. See Alabama
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In Alabama Libertarian,the federal district court addressed the issue of government
speech under the First Amendment right of free association.' 17 The court stated that
the freedom of association guarantee encompasses the related yet often conflicting
values of the right to free expression and the right to refrain from expression."' Cases
addressing compelled expression assume that forcing an individual to endorse a
particular view is as great an infringement on First Amendment rights as prohibiting
that expression." 9
The Alabama Libertariancourt compared two lines of compelled expression cases
where the United States Supreme Court struck down the expenditure of taxpayer
funds for ideological purposes: (1) cases where plaintiffs challenged the use of their
money to support ideological causes; and (2) cases where the government forced
a citizen to be associated with an ideological message. 121 In the first line of cases, the
plaintiffs challenged a bar association or union's use of compulsory dues to support
ideological causes with which the plaintiffs disagreed, claiming that the use of
plaintiffs' money amounted to compelled expression.'I In the second line of cases,
the plaintiffs claimed that requiring them to engage in some form of physical
expression forced them to voice an official doctrine."
The Alabama Libertariancourt cursorily dismissed the plaintiff's claim under the
second line of Supreme Court compelled expression cases." The court stated that
the city's use of taxpayer funds did not require the plaintiff to be a courier for an
ideological message. 2 5 Instead, the court compared the plaintiff s claim to the first
line of Supreme Court cases where the government compelled expression through the
use of a plaintiff s money. 26 As a result, the court determined that spending public
funds to influence an election could only violate the freedom of expression guarantee
if the speech was endorsing an ideological cause.'
1. Freedom of Association Challenges and Compulsory Dues
Bar and union dues cases, like the plaintiff s challenge in Alabama Libertarian,
involve situations where members object to bar association or union use of

Libertarian,694 F. Supp. at 819; see also Common Cause, 858 F.2d at 11. However, the Colorado Supreme Court
in Mountain States did state that there is "an implicit recognition that such expenditures raise potentially serious
constitutional questions." Mountain States, 459 F. Supp. at 349-50. Constitutional principles used to support its
decision included the First Amendment right to petition and Article IV's guarantee clause, see U.S. CONST. art. IV,

§ 3.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

See Alabama Libertarian,694 F. Supp. at 816.
See id.
See id. at 821 (citing Buckley v. Valeo,424 U.S. 1 (1976)).
See id. (citing Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977)).
See id. at 817.
See, e.g., Keller v State Bar of California, 496 U.S. 1 (1990) (bar dues); Abood, 431 U.S. 209 (union

dues).
123. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (the plaintiffs challenged a New Hampshire law
requiring automobile drivers to carry the motto "live free or die" on their license plates); West Virginia State Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 629 (1943) (plaintiffs objected to a law requiring recitation of the pledge of
allegiance in school).
124. See Alabama Libertarian,694 F. Supp. at 817 (citing Wooley, 430 U.S. 705).
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. See id.
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compulsory dues to support causes that the members opposed. In these cases, the
Supreme Court declared that the use of members' dues in support of ideological
causes that are unrelated to the organization's purpose infringes upon an individual's
freedom of belief."2 For instance, in Keller v. State Bar of California,29 the Supreme
Court declared that the government could not compel an individual to endorse an
ideological position through the use of compulsory bar dues for lobbying on
ideological legislation. 130 In bar dues cases, courts have narrowed the scope of a bar
in
association's permissible expenditures to activities that serve the state's interest
31
regulating the legal profession or improving the quality of legal services.'
Like defendants in government advocacy cases, the defendants in bar dues cases
attempt to interpret the scope of their authority broadly-for example, the broad
authority to lobby for the passage of controversial legislation such as gun control,
abortion, and school prayer measures. 132 The Supreme Court has struck down
1 33
expenditures on these issues as clearly outside of the scope of an entity's power.
Similar to government partisan advocacy cases, courts have considered educationallyoriented activities, such as promoting the ethical standards of the bar and continuing
legal education programs, as important enough state interests to justify infringing on
associational rights by charging mandatory dues."3
Drawing from the bar and union dues cases, the Alabama Libertarian court
considered the "critical issue" to be whether the government used public funds for
political or ideological ends. 13 The court upheld the expenditures against a freedom
of association challenge because the city used the dissenting taxpayers' funds to
support a message which was related to "needs common to us all."' 36 The Alabama
Libertariancourt assumed that the speech at issue was neutral because it concerned
a public welfare measure, and disregarded the inherently political nature of any
speech concerning an election.' 37 The court also failed to consider the idea that a
governmental entity engages in political speech anytime that it speaks out in a
partisan way on a proposed change requiring the consent of the voters. Arguably,
Amendment's ban on a
such partisan political speech is prohibited by the First
138
government establishing an ideological point of view.

128. See Keller v. State Bar of California, 496 U.S. 1 (1990). Note that the bar dues cases involve only states
that have integrated bars with mandatory membership. See id.; see also Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209
(1977) (holding that First Amendment principles prohibited union from requiring contribution of dues to support an
ideological cause as a condition of holding a job).
129. 496 U.S. 1 (1990); see Arrow v. Dow, 544 F. Supp. 458 (D.N.M. 1982).
130. See Keller, 496 U.S. 1; see also Arrow, 544 F. Supp. 458.
131. See, e.g., Arrow, 544 F. Supp. at 461-63. Similarly, in union dues cases, the Supreme Court requires the
activities to be "germane to the union's duties as collective bargaining representative." TRIBE, supra note 57, § 12-4,
at 805 n.5.
132. See Keller, 496 U.S. at 15.
133. See id.
134. See, e.g., Arrow, 544 F. Supp at 461.
135. See Alabama Ubertarian Party v. City of Birmingham, 694 F. Supp. 814, 817 (N.D. Ala. 1988).
136. Id.at 817.
137. See id.
138. See generally TRBE,supra note 57, § 12-4, at 804-814.
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2.

Government Speech and First Amendment Political Establishment
Concerns
Scholars have asserted that the First Amendment has an implied prohibition
against government establishment of official doctrine. Courts and commentators have
labeled this implied prohibition "political establishment," borrowing the name from
the First Amendment's religious establishment clause.'39 Political establishment is
the "the advocacy of political viewpoints by or with the assistance of government.""
This limitation is in addition to and consistent with the government's function of
protecting individual ideological beliefs.' 4 ' Because the idea of political
establishment recognizes that individuals, rather than the government, should judge
the merits of arguments, 42 courts have found the issue of First Amendment
political
43
establishment relevant to government partisan advocacy cases.
In government partisan advocacy cases, the judicial emphasis on "[t]he importance
of governmental impartiality in electoral matters"'" reflects a recognition that, in our
democratic political system, the government cannot establish an official view. For
example, in Stem v. Kramarsky, 45 the court referred to the responsibility of an arm
of state government to maintain neutrality and impartiality with regard to electoral
matters.'" In Mountain States, the court pointed out that the school board's activities
amounted to an endorsement of "political ideas," which deviated from its obligation
47
to remain neutral with respect to political issues under the First Amendment.
However, not all government dissemination of political views violates the
prohibition on political establishment. For example, the government does not force
expression of a view simply by advocating a controversial ideological position. 4 8
Courts assume that individuals can ignore objectionable messages. 49 As discussed
above, compelled expression cases involve situations where the government intrudes
on the individual by requiring some form of association with the message, such as
carrying a message on your property or person, or exacting an appreciable amount
of your money to endorse an ideological cause."o
While the Supreme Court has held that a citizen must pay income taxes despite
disagreement with federal expenditures, such as the welfare system,15' other courts

139. See generally Robert D. Kamenshine, The FirstAmendment's Implied Political Establishment Clause,
67 CAL.L. REV. 1104 (1979).
140. See id. at 1104.
141. See Burt v. Blumenauer, 699 P.2d 168, 176 (Or. 1985) (en banc).
142. See Geoffrey R. Stone, ContentRegulation and the FirstAmendment, 25 WM. & MARY L.REV. 189, 228
(1984).
143. See Burt, 699 P.2d at 176.
144. Stanson v. Mott, 551 P.2d 1, 10 (Cal. 1976) (en banc).
145. 375 N.Y.S.2d 235 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
146. See id. at 239.
147. See Mountain States Legal Found. v. Denver Sch. Dist. No. 1,459 F. Supp 357, 360-61 (D. Colo. 1978);
see also Alabama Libertarian Party v. City of Birmingham, 694 F. Supp. 814, 820 (N.D. Ala. 1988).
148. See TRIBE, supra note 57, § 12-4, at 807.
149. See, e.g., Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105, 110 (1932) ("Other forms of advertising are ordinarily seen
as a matter of choice on the part of the observer .... In the case of newspapers and magazines, there must be some
seeking by the one who is to see and read the advertisement. The radio can be turned off . .
150. See TRIBE, supra note 57, § 12-4, at 804.
151. See Crowe v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 396 F.2d 766, 767 (8th Cir. 1968); see also
Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 486-87 (1923); TRIBE, supra note 57, § 12-4, at 807 n.13.
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have rejected the analogy between the collection of bar and union dues and general
1 52
taxes and have found the expenditure of a member's dues to be more "traceable.
The distinction between taxes and union dues is based on the number of taxpayers
and the complexity of the federal tax structure, which render individual expenditures
on general taxes too inconsequential to raise a constitutional problem. 3 The more
relaxed standing rules that courts apply to municipalities demonstrate this distinction,
giving a municipal taxpayer more rights to challenge expenditures in the local than
in the federal system.t54
Courts acknowledge that communicating a position on ideological issues is
necessary for governing.' 55 In Miller v. California Commission on the Status of
Women, 56 the California State Legislature created a commission (Commission) to
study issues relating to women's equality, such as employment and educational
conditions.' 57 The California Legislature and the voters subsequently passed the state
Equal Rights Amendment (ERA).5 In opposition to the ERA's enactment, the
plaintiffs filed an action alleging that the Commission's activities had been
responsible for promoting the ratification of the ERA and the adaptation of
California's laws to the standard set by the ERA." 9 The plaintiffs objected to the
state's establishment of a commission for the promotion of an ideological
viewpoint. "6The court responded that if the government cannot address controversial
topics and engage in similar forms of communication, the government cannot
govern. 61 The Miller court found express wording by the legislature allowing the
Commission to advocate its views concerning the status of women. 62 According to

152. See Keller v. State Bar of California, 767 P.2d 1020, 1039 (Cal. 1989) (en banc) (Kaufman, J., dissenting
in part), rev'd and remanded, 496 U.S. 1 (1990).
153. See Keller, 767 P.2d at 1039 (Kaufman, J., dissenting in part).
154. See id.; see also TRIBE, supra note 57, § 12-4, at 807-08 n.14. Courts have stated that "[tlhe rule
upholding municipal taxpayer standing appears to rest on the assumption that the relatively small number of taxpayers
involved, and the close relationship between residents of a municipality and their local government[,] results in a
direct and palpable injury whenever tax revenues are misused." Alabama libertarian Party v. City of Birmingham,
694 F. Supp. 814, 816 (N.D. Ala. 1988) (quoting Taub v. Kentucky, 842 F.2d 912, 918 (6th Cir. 1988)).
155. See Miller v. California Comm'n on the Status of Women, 198 Cal. Rptr. 877, 882 (Ct. App. 1984).
Controversial speech is determined by measuring "the degree of attention paid to an issue by government officials,
community leaders, and the media." See Kaminshine, supra note 139, at 1113-14. A determination of public
importance depends on whether the issue relates to a social or political choice currently confronting a community and
the impact, as perceived by the public, that the issue is likely to have in the community. See id. at 1114. Given the
controversy surrounding the issue in both Burt and in Carter,and the fact that the speech was directed at influencing
the outcome of an election, the government partisan advocacy in those two cases was political and controversial.
156. 198 Cal. Rptr. 877 (Ct. App. 1984).
157. See Miller, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 879 (Plaintiff alleged that the state, by authorizing and providing funding for
the commission, had unlawfully put its "imprimatur" on the ideological activities which included expressing opinions
on issues of women's educational and employment problems, needs, and career opportunities.).
158. See id.
159. See id.
160. Seeid.at881.
at 882.
161. See id.
162. The California Legislature has
"expressly authorized [the Commission] to state its position and viewpoint on issues developed
in the performance of its duties and responsibilities.".... The authorization for the [C]ommission
to speak its mind 'on issues' developed on these matters can only be interpreted as a legislative
warrant to advocate and promote the [C]ommission's positions on these subjects.
Id. at 880 (quoting CAL. GOV'T CODE § 8246(b) (West 1992)) (footnote and citations omitted).
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the court, the 63
expenditures were constitutional because they did not tell the citizens
how to vote.
However, the New York Supreme Court declared, in Stern v. Kramarsky," that
agency expenditures on partisan advocacy for state constitutional amendments are an
improper agency function under the state and federal Constitution. 65 The court also
stated that campaigning for or against constitutional amendments "demean[s] the
democratic process. ' ' " In the context of an election "no agency may misuse any such
funds for promoting its own opinions, whims or beliefs, irrespective of the high
ideals or worthy cause it espouses, promotes or promulgates."' 67
In contrast to the Alabama Libertariancourt's identification of the "critical issue"
under the First Amendment as whether the expenditure concerned a matter with
either an ideological or neutral nature, 61 other jurisdictions have identified the
"critical issue" as whether the spending of funds was directed at the outcome of an
election and whether the government crossed the line into the realm of establishing
official doctrine. 69 For example, the evil in Miller and Stern was not the ideological
bent of the issue or the government speech concerning it, but the context in which the
speech was made. Both cases stated that expenditures that are directed at an election
are inappropriate when "government speech has entered the lists in a political
controversy submitted to a vote of the people."'"7
3. Grounds for Heightened Judicial Review
Courts have articulated reasons why certain forms of government actions, such as
the kind at issue in this Comment, particularly interfere with the operation of the
political process, warranting heightened judicial scrutiny. In the famous footnote four
of United States v. Carolene Products Co.,
the Supreme Court presented a
rationale for determining when a court should exercise heightened judicial review of
a legislative enactment.'72 Under this analysis, a court should independently review
legislation that disrupts the operation of the political system. 173 For instance,
legislation restricting specific constitutional guarantees, namely the first ten
Amendments, and legislation discriminating against racial minorities implicitly

163. See id. at 883. But see Stem v. Kramarsky, 375 N.Y.S.2d 235 (Sup. Ct. 1975) (wherein the brochures
directly told the citizens to vote for the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA)). Stem involved expenditures on a proposed
equal rights amendment to the New York Constitution. See Stem, 375 N.Y.S.2d at 236. The New York Coalition for
Equal Rights and the League of Women Voters aired radio and television broadcasts and distributed brochures stating:
"It's really quite simple. Either you believe that all people are created equal or you don't. If you do * * * Vote Yes
on Nov. 4th." Id. (quoting New York Coalition for Equal Rights and the League of Women Voters).
164. 375 N.Y.S.2d 235.
165. See id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 239-40.
168. See Alabama Libertarian Party v. City of Birmingham, 694 F. Supp. 814, 817 (N.D. Ala. 1988); see also
supranote 135 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 144-147, notes 164-167, and accompanying text.
170. Miller v. California Comm'n on the Status of Women, 198 Cal. Rptr. 877, 883 (Ct. App. 1984); see Stem
375 N.Y.S.2d at 237.
171. 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
172. See id.
173. See id.
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interferes with the political process. Racially discriminatory legislation in the area
175
of voting makes it harder for certain groups to participate in the political process,
speech inhibits open debate which is at the heart of
and legislation that suppresses
76
the First Amendment.

Legislation that interferes with the political process differs from other forms of
restrictive legislation because these other forms are capable, at least in theory, of
being checked by the political process. 77 If voters disagree with the legislators
responsible for passing the legislation, they can vote them out of office. 78 Restricting
communications, on the other hand, inhibits the flow of information between
government and individuals that is necessary for making informed choices, and thus
79
prevents meaningful oversight of government activities by an informed electorate.
Scholars and courts compare the effects of a government adding its own voice to
the effects of restrictions on communications, asserting that it is a bias comparable
to suppressing speech.'80 As authors John E. Nowak and Ronald D. Rotunda have
stated, illustrating the effect that restriction of speech has on the political process:
"[s]peech is part of the legislative process itself. Restriction of speech alters the
democratic process and undercuts the basis for deferring to the legislation that
emerges."''
To summarize, although court decisions hold that government partisan advocacy
may be inconsistent with principles implied in the Constitution, particularly the First
Amendment, courts have not yet developed a constitutional analysis that is
specifically applicable to government speech. Instead, courts have generally focused
on the same constitutional concerns when considering the integrity of the electoral
process, regardless of the issues involved. However, government speech poses unique
theoretical problems and conflicts with specific principles implied in the
Constitution. For instance, government speech violates the government's duty to
remain impartial with regard to elections, potentially distorts the political process in
an area in which it cannot correct ittelf, uses the dues of a dissenting citizen
infringing on the right of free association, obscures accountability, and threatens selfperpetuation in power.

174. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 14, § 16.7(a), at 993 n.2 (citing CaroteneProducts, 304 U.S. at 15253 n.4).
175. See GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTIrruONAL LAW 996 (9th ed. 1985) (citing Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319
U.S. 105, 115 (1943)).
176. See id.
177. The Carolene Products Court considered, but did not decide, "whether legislation which restricts those
political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected
to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other
types of legislation." Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152-53 n.4.
178. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 14, § 16.6, 16.7, at 991-993.
179. See Kamenshine, supra note 139, at 1105.
180. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Protecting the Democratic Process: Voter Standing to Challenge Abuses of
Incumbency, 49 Omo ST. LJ.773, 777 (1988). Chemerinsky, in the context of candidate elections and abuses of the
office for electioneering, asserts that "[t]he matter cannot be left to the political process because the very claim is that
the incumbent is subverting that process and preventing it from serving as a true reflection of the popular will." Id.
at 778. According to Chemerinsky, using government workers to perform campaign tasks while working is one form
of abuse by incumbents. See id. at 774.
181. Nowak & Rotunda, supra note 14, § 16.7(a), at 993.
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IV. GOVERNMENT AS SPEAKER
Few cases discuss the government's right to speak under the First Amendment or
the First Amendment repercussions of suppressing that speech.'82 Instead, most cases
focus on government interference with the political process." 3 The issue of whether
the government may assert its own First Amendment rights raises compelling
questions about the values that the First Amendment should protect. According to the
text of the First Amendment and under traditional First Amendment theory, the First
Amendment monitors laws that restrict an individual's expression.' " However, the
Supreme Court has focused on the informational value of the speech itself and the
public's right to hear. 85 This raises questions regarding the potential for unjustified
suppression of and interference with the government's right to speak.'86
Courts and scholars that have considered this issue approach the government
entity's assertion of First Amendment rights with skepticism. In Anderson v.
Boston,'87 the Massachusetts Supreme Court declined to address Boston's claim of
a First Amendment right to disseminate the information.'88 Rather than addressing
the issue of whether Boston had a First Amendment right to speak, the court
examined the speech itself, and discussed whether the First Amendment protects the
type of information that the city tried to disseminate. 89 The court considered
Boston's actions to be political speech, which is at the heart of First Amendment
protections.' 90 However, the court found that the state interest in the integrity of the

182. See Anderson v. Boston, 380 N.E.2d 628, 635-36 (Mass. 1978) ("[Tlhere has been almost no judicial
consideration of the impact of rights of freedom of speech on the right of State or local governments to use public
funds to advocate a position on a question being submitted to the voters."), stayed by, City of Boston v. Anderson,
439 U.S. 1389, (Brennan, J., as Circuit Justice), affid mem., 439 U.S. 951 (1978) (motion to vacate stay order
denied); Ster v. Kramarsky, 375 N.Y.S.2d 235, 240 (Sup. Ct. 1975) (rejecting government defendants' argument
that an injunction would abridge their First Amendment rights); see also Campbell v. Joint District 28-J, 704 F.2d
501, 503 (10th Cir. 1983) (dismissing defendants' contention that the restriction imposed by the district court violated
their First Amendment rights).
183. See discussion supra Part III.
184. The text of the First Amendment states: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend.
1.
185. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (protecting the public's right to receive
advertisements providing truthful information about prices for prescription drugs); see also Anderson, 380 N.E.2d
at 636 n.12 (citing Madison Joint Sch. Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167, 175
n.7 (1976)) ("[Tlhe subject of government as a party to communications has continued generally to be neglected in
its constitutional aspect."); Mark G. Yudof, When Governments Speak- Toward a Theory of Government Expression
and the FirstAmendment, 57 TEx. L. REv. 863, 867 (1979). Yudof asserts that constitutional decisions do not support
a government's right to speak: '"here may be policy reasons to protect government speech for the good of all, but
it is inconceivable that governments may assert First Amendment rights against the interests of the larger
community." Yudof, supra, at 867-68.
186. See generally id.
187. 380 N.E.2d 628.
188. See id. at 636.
189. See id.
190. See id. at 637.
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democratic process, and the appearance of fairness, was compelling enough to justify
enjoining the expenditures. 9'
Prior to the events in Anderson, the United States Supreme Court, in First
NationalBank of Boston v. Bellotti,'" for the first time extended First Amendment
protection to corporations wishing to speak out on campaign issues. In Bellotti, the
Court invalidated under the First Amendment an earlier version of the Massachusetts
statute at issue in Anderson.'9 3 This statute restricted private corporation campaign
expenditures on ballot issues which materially affected corporate business assets."
In Bellotti, a corporation which sought to campaign on a broader range of issues,
challenged the expenditure.'9 5 The Supreme Court invalidated the legislation and
stated that the informational value of the company's advocacy justified its protection,
regardless of the speaker's identity as a corporation."
Adopting Bellotti' s rationale, the City of Boston in Anderson argued that if the
First Amendment protected the speech of business corporations, then it also should
apply to municipal corporations. 97 The events in Anderson arose directly out of the
Bellotti ruling. 98 In Anderson, the same corporation embarked on a campaign to
defeat a referendum on the 1978 ballot.' 99 The corporation objected to the same
proposed state constitutional amendment that Boston supported."e The measure
would have eased the homeowners' tax burden by shifting the bulk of it to business
and industry.2 °' In response, Boston planned a publicity campaign to promote the
proposed amendment. ° Boston claimed that the advertisements were necessary to
counter the corporation's extensive expenditures on the campaign, expenditures
which were made possible by the holding in Bellotti.' 3
Although the Massachusetts Supreme Court in Anderson rejected the comparison
between municipal and business corporations and enjoined the expenditures, Justice
Brennan, acting as Circuit Judge, in a brief memorandum opinion which was upheld
by the whole Court, upheld Boston's right to campaign for the measure. 2°4 Justice
Brennan used language suggesting an implicit recognition of a municipal corpora-

191.

See id. The Anderson court acknowledged the municipality's First Amendment right to expend funds to

influence legislative processes in other contexts, such as lobbying, but distinguished partisan advocacy during an
election, stating that "[miunicipal action concerning legislation has statutory, traditional, and constitutional
foundations which are not applicable to municipal action on questions submitted to the people." Id. at 635 n.11.
192. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).

193. See id. at 766.
194. See Ryan, supra note 14, at 1125.
195. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 776.
196. See id. "The proper question therefore is not whether corporations 'have' First Amendment rights and,
if so, whether they are coextensive with those of natural persons. Instead, the question must be whether [the law]
abridges expression that the First Amendment was meant to protect." Id.; see also GERALD GUNTHER,
CONSTrruTIONAL LAW 1369 (12th ed. 1991).
197. See Ryan, supra note 14, at 1125.
198. See id.
199. See id.
200. See id.
201. See id.
202. See id.
203. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supranote 14, § 16.11, at 1003 n. 1.
204. See City of Boston v. Anderson, 439 U.S. 1389, 1390 (motion to stay order by Brennan, J., as Circuit
Justice), affd mem., 439 U.S. 951 (1978) (motion to vacate stay order denied).
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tion's First Amendment right to disseminate its views.20 5 Justice Brennan noted that
speech to promote a constitutional amendment changing property tax valuations was
akin to private corporate speech.' According to Justice Brennan, if other interests,
including large commercial or industrial agencies, could finance their opposition to
a constitutional amendment, then Boston should be able to finance its view as well.'
Justice Brennan found that the corporation's speech had informational value which
helped the public to form judgments about political issues and candidates.20 8 Justice
Brennan reasoned that if Boston was not allowed to proceed with its promotion of the
amendment, Boston would be foreclosed forever from communicating its support to
the electorate "as required in the interests of all taxpayers, including residential
property owners." 9
Like Anderson and Bellotti, Carter involved a municipality and a private
corporation with strong interests in the outcome of an election. 210 The Las Cruces
City Commissioners claimed that they launched a media campaign on behalf of their
citizens, who had been paying some of the highest utility prices in the nation to an
out-of-state power company. 21' The City asserted the right and obligation to advise
its voters about the advantages of acquiring a citizen-owned electric utility. 2 2 In a
letter to its employees, the City Commissioners complained that the private company
was planning to wage a multi-million dollar campaign to fight the City's effort.21 3
Another group which opposed the utility acquisition, "People Against Costly
Municipal Takeover," also allegedly launched its own campaign featuring television
spots of people discussing their concerns about the utility acquisition. 214

205. See id.
206. See id.
207. See id.
208. See id.; see also Yudof, supra note 185, at 866. Yudof suggests that government speech is necessary to
curtail the influence of large corporations who have the power and the money to control the forums of communication.
See id.
209. Anderson, 439 U.S. at 1390.
210. See Carter v. City of Las Cruces, 121 N.M. 580, 915 P.2d 336 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 121 N.M. 644,
916 P.2d 844 (1996); see also supranote 3 and accompanying text.
211. See Carter, 121 N.M. 580, 915 P.2d 336.
212. See Transcript of Proceedings at 43, Carter v. City of Las Cruces, 121 N.M. 580, 915 P.2d 336 (Ct. App.)
(No. CV-94-605), cert. denied, 121 N.M. 644, 916 P.2d 844 (1996).
213. Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, Exhibit F at 000027, Carter v.City
of Las Cruces, 121 N.M. 580, 915 P.2d 336 (Ct. App.) (No. CV-94-605), cert. denied, 121 N.M. 644, 916 P.2d 844
(1996); see Terrance Vestal, Electric Utility Bidder Scorns City Meeting, LAS CRUCES SUN-NEWS, ___,
1994,
at A-I, cited in Memorandum in Support of Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction,
Exhibit C at 000065, Carter v. City of Las Cruces, 121 N.M. 580, 915 P.2d 336 (Ct. App.) (No. CV-94-605), cert.
denied, 121 N.M. 644, 916 P.2d 844 (1996).
214. See Terrance Vestal, City Unveils Campaignto "Unplug, " LAS CRUCES SUN-NEws, _
1994, at
A-I, cited in Memorandum in Support of Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction,
Exhibit C at 000065, Carter v. City of Las Cruces, 121 N.M. 580, 915 P.2d 336 (Ct. App.) (No. CV-94-605), cert.
denied, 121 N.M. 644, 916 P.2d 844 (1996). Las Cruces wanted to "get out from under [the] El Paso Electric
Company because [C]ity officials say its rates are some of the highest in the nation." Id. When the utility was near
bankruptcy, the Las Cruces City Commissioners drafted a proposal to buy the bankrupt utility to create a citizen
owned electric utility. See id. Central and South West Corporation, a private Texas company, also were potential
bidders. See id. There was a dispute as to whether rates would increase under the City's or under the private
company's proposal. See id. While surveys conducted by the private company projected that utility rates would
increase by 30% if the City acquired the utility, the City's surveys projected that rates would drop between 20% to
29% if the City acquired the utility. See id. Figures on reduced utility rates were part of the City's advertising
campaign. See id.
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Authorities acknowledge that local governments may have a valid basis for
making campaign expenditures. As discussed above, home rule charters confer broad
law making authority on municipalities.2 5 In addition, given their position as a small
entity, municipalities and other subdivisions have a significant interest in state
constitutional amendments, bond issues, and referendums-an interest akin to, 2 16 and
a conduit for, their constituents' interest.2 17
In City Affairs Committee of Jersey City v. Board of Commissioners of Jersey
City,218 an early state case, a municipality used public funds to advocate for the

adoption of a state constitutional amendment. 2 9 The court in City Affairs considered
"the right of self-advancement and self-protection" to be the "very essence" of a local
government's power.' The court used language that was sensitive to the value of an
informed electorate, but did not expressly mention the First Amendment."
According to the court, the city's advocacy was justified in light of the need for "a
more intelligent understanding of the issues, which ordinarily are not free from
complexity when they involve changes in the state's organic law."222 Commentators
have recognized this very need for information which may be heightened in the
context of a referendum, because the voters can not rely on party lines to make their
choices. 2 3
V.

IS "GOVERNMENT SPEECH" AS OMINOUS AS IT SOUNDS OR IS IT
RHETORIC LIKE THE PARTISAN MESSAGES IT COMPRISES?

A.

ProblemsPosed by Government PartisanAdvocacy
Scholars and courts that see a significant problem with government speech
distinguish it from other forms of government participation in the political process.
Those that would prohibit government speech believe that allowing government
partisan advocacy activates the special implications of government speech. 2' As a
result, while government partisan advocacy may have informative value, the First
Amendment acts to concurrently safeguard the political process. 2z It does so by
promoting the free spread of information and opinion about government affairs so
that the public can make uncoerced decisions. 226 In addition, at least one court has

215. For a discussion of home rule charters, see supra Part ll.B.
216. See supra note 154.

217.
218.
219.
220.

See infra notes 230 and accompanying text.
46 A.2d 425 (N.J. 1946).
Seeid. at427.
Id.

221.

See id.

222. Id.
223. See Ryan, supra note 14, at 1120.
224. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principlesand Some FirstAmendment Problems, 47 IND. L. J. 1, 18
(1971).

225. See id.
226. See id. "[The First Amendment protects] [florms of thought and expression within the range of human
communications from which the voter derives the knowledge, intelligence, sensitivity to human values: the capacity
for sane and objective judgment which, so far as possible, a ballot should express." Id. (quoting Alexander
Meiklejohn, The FirstAmendment Is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. Cr. REv. 245, 255);'seealso Ryan, supranote 14, at
1116.
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held that the principles of representative government found in the Constitution
provide an independent basis aside from the First Amendment for invalidating
expenditures on government partisan advocacy.227
In ballot or referendum elections and other state law approval processes, the
political process delegates power directly to the people. 2' For example, the final
decision on the utility acquisition in Carterrested with the City's inhabitants.22 9 The
Anderson court, and the dissent in City Affairs, distinguished between a
municipality's traditional role in endorsing the interests of the inhabitants through
lobbying, and its obligation to remain neutral on questions submitted directly to the
voters. 230 Thus, these cases reveal judicial recognition that in our democratic system,
a government's duty to inform is equal to its duty to refrain from endorsing an
official point of view in an election context.
The issue of government partisan advocacy before an election brings to light the
potential problems posed by government speech in general. Although in Carterand
similar cases, the government added to the pool of information and did not directly
suppress other views, courts and scholars, nevertheless, argue that government
speech, in and of itself, has its own coercive quality."3 They argue that government
speech impacts the exchange of information within the political process in a way
which is analogous to government suppression of speech."
For instance, government as speaker tends to confuse and prejudice the issues,
affecting its hearers differently than other forms of campaign speech. 3 As a result
voters may tend to defer to the government's judgment -although the assumption
that government has an especially influential effect on the people depends on the

227. See Mountain States Legal Found. v. Denver Sch. Dist. No. 1,459 F. Supp. 357, 361 (D. Colo. 1978);
see also Stem v. Kramarsky, 375 N.Y.S.2d 235, 237 (Sup. Ct. 1975) ("Thus the issue raised by the instant application
is not one concerning freedom of speech or association, but whether it is a proper function of a state agency to actively
support a proposed amendment to the state constitution .... "). The Burt court highlighted the special problems that
government partisan advocacy poses:
It hardly seems necessary to rely on the First Amendment, at least when government resources are
devoted to promoting one side in an election on which the legitimacy of the government itself
rests. The principles of representative government enshrined in our constitutions would limit
government intervention on behalf of its own candidates or against their opponents even if the
First Amendment and its state equivalents had never been adopted.
Burt v. Blumenauer, 699 P.2d 168, 175 (Or. 1985) (en banc).
228. See Ziegler, supra note 8, at 615; see also First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791-92
(1978). In Bellotti, the Supreme Court emphasized the First Amendment value of the people being responsible for
evaluating the strengths of arguments. See Belloti, 435 U.S. at 791. The Court stated that the government should not
assume "the task of ultimate judgment [with regard to political matters], lest the people lose their ability to govern
themselves." Id. at 792 n.31.
229. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
230. See Anderson v. Boston, 380 N.E.2d 628, 635-36 & n.12 (Mass. 1978), stayed by, City of Boston v.
Anderson, 439 U.S. 1389, (Brennan, J., as Circuit Justice), affid mem., 439 U.S. 951 (1978) (motion to vacate stay
order denied).
231. See, e.g., Stanson v. Mott, 551 P.2d 1, 10 (Cal. 1976) (en banc) (quoting Gould v. Grubb, 536 P.2d 1337,
1345 (Cal. 1975) (en banc) (Government partisan speech before an election "distorts the preferences of participating
voters.")); see also Stanson, 551 P.2d at 10 (quoting Gould, 536 P.2d at 1348) ("Our state and federal Constitutions
mandate that the government must, if possible, avoid any feature that might adulterate or, indeed, frustrate, that free
and pure choice ... ").
232. See, e.g., Stanson, 551 P.2d at 10.
233. See Ryan, supra note 14,.at 1134.
234. See id.
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public's reverence and respect for govemment. 5 Also, in cases like Carter, the
government used the "prestige and influence" that accompanies any government
endorsement to influence the outcome of the electoral process. 6 Thus, the
government may not only affirmatively tell the electorate how to view an issue, but
in addition, may use the prestige of government and its "authoritative voice 2 37 to
obtain the voters' approval.23 8
Commentators further would argue that, under the guise of gaining the public's
support and consent, government partisan advocacy helps the government to
implement its policies in a manner that ultimately affects the way people are
governed. 239 Just as government suppression of dissident speech potentially insulates
government from criticism caused by the debate, government advocacy renders the
voters, rather than the government, accountable for its policies." This occurs when
the voters, responding to the authoritative voice of government advocacy, pass or
reject measures through the political process. In addition, a government may have
motives for speaking other than the public interest. Government has the power to
suppress, and those in power may try to abuse that power.2"
The value of free expression in our system rests on political outcomes that are
responsive to the public will.2 2 Government speech, even if its effect is only
minimally coercive on public opinion, may be inconsistent with this goal. At the very
least, government support for one view distorts the process by forcing the dissenters
to subsidize a view with which they disagree and may dilute the dissenters' votes.u3
When government enters the political fray in cases like Carter, it interferes' with the
exercise of the electoral franchise, a right which is "at the heart of the democratic
process."' An election is the forum within a democracy where citizens exercise their
choice regarding how they shall be governed.

235. In Carter, a greater percentage of people surveyed trusted the City Commissioners more than the private
utility company whose promotional efforts the City claimed to be countering. See Motion for Temporary Restraining
Order and Preliminary Injunction, Exhibit I at 00044, Carter v. City of Las Cruces, 121 N.M. 580, 915 P.2d 336 (Ct.
App.) (No. CV-94-605), cert. denied, 121 N.M. 644, 916 P.2d 844 (1996). This statistic tends to support the assertion
that the citizens of Las Cruces may vote according to the City's position regardless of whether they are adequately
informed of the other side of the issue. However, government attempts at persuading the electorate are arguably as
valid as any other source from which the voters receive the information.
236. See Stern v. Kramarsky, 375 N.Y.S.2d 235, 237 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
237. See Ryan, supra note 14, at 1134.
238. See THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPREsSION 698 (1970) ("Emanating from a
source of great authority in the society government expression carries extra psychological weight for many citizens.").
239. See Ryan, supra note 14, at 1131.
240. See Chemerinsky, supra note 180, at 774 ("Accountability is subverted if an incumbent can use the
resources of the office to perpetuate his or her occupancy of the office."); Kamenshine, supra note 139, at 1105 ("If
a government can manipulate that marketplace, it can ultimately subvert the processes by which the people hold it
accountable."); see also Stern, 375 N.Y.S.2d at 238 (Government advocacy endows "the campaign with all of the
prestige and influence naturally arising from any endorsement of a governmental authority.").
241. See Ryan, supra note 14, at 1133 n.179. "Such a motive may well arise in the context of a referendum
that challenges established methods of government that the present bureaucracy may be unwilling to relinquish." Id.
at 1133.
242. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 244 (1993).

243. See Chemerinsky, supra note 180, at 778 ("Those who support challengers have their votes diluted by
abuse of incumbency in exactly the same way the malapportionment or stuffing of the ballot box lessens the
effectiveness of an individual's vote.").
244. Burson v. Freedman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (The state had a compelling interest in protecting a citizen's
right to vote in an election conducted with integrity and reliability.).
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Government speech is especially inappropriate in an election context where courts
have stated that governments may educate, but they may not advocate. 245 The
distinction that courts make between education and advocacy recognizes the
importance of the free formation of informed opinion which is essential to
democracy. 24 6 The judiciary has recognized that in an election context, allowing a
subdivision to engage in partisan advocacy would make "the creature greater than the
creator''247 ina government that is designed so that the source of power originates in
the people." 8
B.

Government Speech and FirstAmendment Theory
Some commentators argue that government speech does not present a serious
problem.4 9 First, free speech and First Amendment doctrines are based on the
° Courts that
assumption that people can appreciate speech for what it is.5
have found
no First Amendment problem with government speech rely on the premise that an
individual has the facility to evaluate among different messages. 25' For instance, the
Alabama Libertariancourt dismissed any claim that government speech coerces the
formation of public opinion. 2 The court declared that citizen taxpayers who
disagreed with the expenditure could either dissent at the polls of the bond election
or when the officials were up for election, the traditional means for eliminating
abuses and bad policies in our political system."
Second, government speech in the United States should not be equated to
propaganda in other societies, such as totalitarian regimes. These latter societies
suppress all other voices besides the state, resulting in a strong control over public
opinion.5 4 In contrast, the United States is probably the site of more communication
against the government than in any other country.255
Third, the facts in cases such as Anderson and Carterarguably show that even if
state legislatures enact restraints on government speech, other sources, such as mass
media conglomerates and large corporations, threaten to shape and control public

245. See Citizens to Protect Pub. Funds v. Board of Educ. of Parsippany Troy-Hills, 98 A.2d 673, 677-78 (N.J.
1953) (finding implied legislative authorization for the expenditure of funds on an informational booklet about a bond
proposal, but invalidating the school board's expenditure because it presented only one side of an issue); Stem v.

Kramarsky, 375 N.Y.S.2d 235, 239 (Sup. Ct. 1975) (holding that a state agency may not use public monies to
advocate for or against an issue, but it may educate, inform, or act to promote voting on an issue); Burt v.

Blumenauer, 799 P.2d 168, 172-73 (Or. 1985) (en banc).
246. See Mountain States Legal Found. v. Denver Sch. Dist. No. 1, 459 F. Supp. 347, 360 (D. Colo. 1978).
247. City Affairs Comrn'n of Jersey City v. Board of Comm'rs of Jersey City, 46 A.2d 425, 432 (N.J. 1946)
(Colie, J., joined by Parker, J., Oliphant, J., and Freund, J., dissenting).

248. See id.
249. See generally Tushnet, supra note 57, at 129; see generally also Schauer, supra note 8, at 382.
250. See Tushnet, supra note 57, at 129.
251. See id. at 132.
252. See Alabama Libertarian Party v. City of Birmingham, 694 F. Supp. 814, 820 (N.D. Ala. 1988).
253. See Alabama Libertarian, 694 F. Supp. at 820.
254. See Ziegler, supra note 8, at 579. Propaganda played a central role in Nazi Germany, demonstrating the
negative import officially released propaganda entails. See id. at 605. The Nazi Minister of propaganda, summed up
the role of propaganda in Nazi society when stating that the state has an "absolute right... to supervise the formation
of public opinion." Id.
255. See Schauer, supra note 8,at 380.
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opinion more dramatically than government messages. 6 Furthermore, courts have
First Amendment claim if the
not ruled that government speech presents a cognizable
257
challenge is based solely on the First Amendment.
Government speech on both ideological and public safety issues is necessary for
governing. 258 Arguably there are legitimate uses of public monies for speech, even
if some taxpayers oppose the views that are expressed. The content of government
communications varies from conveying purely ideological viewpoints, such as
displaying a flag or other national emblem,5 9 to providing practical information, such
as public service messages about the dangers of smoking. 26°
Government speech is not only necessary to inform the electorate, but also is
important to maintain stability by helping to secure the government's power without
the pervasive use of force.26t Furthermore, it can be argued that government must
communicate to the public about its policies and approaches to governing.
Government. projects and the communications concerning them, such as
provide the basis for the free and open debate of
congressional and agency reports, 262
issues in a self-governing society.
The First Amendment does not prohibit government from spending the taxes of
a dissenting citizen when decisions are made by the representative branches.263 The
individual "has implicitly deferred, through the organic law, the question's resolution
to the people's representatives."' For example, according to the Miller court, the
plaintiffs' assertion that government cannot address women's equality issues was
equivalent to saying that the government cannot form a position on controversial
topics 265-and prohibiting the government from speaking on contentious issues

256. See, e.g., F'rst Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 804-12 (1978) (White, J., dissenting)
(noting that, while corporate communications do come under the First Amendment, these communications do not
necessarily serve First Amendment values).
Since the 1970s, when Bellotti and Anderson were decided, the media conglomerates increasingly have dominated
the channels of communication, and their influence is expanding to control over elected officials. See Ben. H.
Bagdildan, The Lords of the Global Village, THE NATION, June 12, 1989, at 805, 806. Bagdikian asserts that those
that own the output of information consist of:
A few media multinationals that now command the field... [who] have their own political
agenda. All resist economic changes that do not support their own financial interests. Together,
they exert a homogenizing power over ideas, culture and commerce that affects populations larger
than any in history. Neither Caesar nor Hitler, Franklin Roosevelt nor any Pope, has commanded
as much power to shape the information on which so many people depend to make decisions
about everything from whom to vote for to what to eat.
Id. at 806.
257. See Alabama Libertarian,694 F. Supp. at 814; see also discussion supra Part IlI.C and PartM.D.
258. See Burt v. Blumenauer, 699 P.2d 168, 172 (Or. 1975) (en banc).
259. See TRIBE, supra note 57, § 12-4, at 807.
260. See Schauer, supranote 8, at 374.
261. See Ziegler, supra note 8, at 604 ("Government expression in a variety of forms is both proper and
necessary in a system that attempts to govern itself with a minimum use of force.").
262. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 14, § 16.11, at 1004.
263. See Ziegler, supra note 8, at 615.
264. See id.
265. See Miller v. California Comm'n on the Status of Women, 198 Cal. Rptr. 877, 882 (Ct. App. 1984) ("If
the government . . . cannot appoint a commission to speak on the topic without implicating plaintiffs' First
Amendment rights it may not address any other 'controversial' topics. If the government cannot address controversial
topics it cannot govern.").
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would prevent the government from governing.' Alternatively, if the public objects
to the government's speech, they can elect officials who will promote different views.
C. The GeneralRule
The various interests involved in government partisan advocacy cases are the
government's right to speak, the public's right to be informed, and the conflicting
value of the public's right to be free from a biased political process. Courts attempt
to reconcile these various rights by allowing governmental entities to speak while
monitoring the tone of their advocacy. In other words, courts require impartiality. As
a result, the general rule regarding government speech allows a government to use
tax dollars to present its views only if the communication lies outside the context of
an election. During an electoral race, a public entity may spend taxpayer funds for
informational campaign activities only if the expenditures are related to the entity's
purpose, and the entity presents both sides of the issue.
In Carter, the New Mexico Court of Appeals, without ruling on the issue,
recognized that "at some threshold level a public entity must refrain from spending
public funds to promote a partisan position during an election campaign."2 67 To
determine this threshold level, courts focus on the "style, tenor, and timing of the
publication. 268 The timing element literally refers to whether the entity made or
attempted to make the expenditure near election time. For instance, the Stern and
Miller courts both considered the propriety of state expenditures that promoted the
ERA. 69 Miller distinguished Stem, which struck down the expenditures, because the
expenditures in Miller were not directly related to matters submitted to the vote of the
people.27
The style and tenor elements refer to the vehemency of the advocacy, and whether
the entity engaged in persuasive tactics, such as warning the public of the
consequences of voting against their position.27 Government entities may present a
fair presentation of facts, but the line between informing and impermissibly
persuading can be difficult to determine. 272 The California Supreme Court
acknowledged that even in situations where the entity does not tell its citizens to
support or to oppose a measure, a presentation could still be an improper campaign
273
activity if the entity does not present both sides of the issue.
The court in Citizens to Protect Public Funds v. Board of Education of
Parsippany-Troy Hills274 defined a fair presentation of facts as including the

266. See id.
267. Carter v. City of Las Cruces, 121 N.M. 580, 583, 915 P.2d 336, 339 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 121 N.M.
644, 916 P.2d 844 (1996).
268. See Stanson v. Mott, 551 P.2d 1, 12 (Cal. 1976) (en banc).
269. See Miller v. California Comm'n on the Status of Women, 198 Cal. Rptr. 877 (Ct. App. 1984); Stem v.
Kramarsky, 375 N.Y.S.2d 235 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
270. In Stem, the Commission also had published flyers directly telling the voters to "Vote Yes." See Stern,

375 N.Y.S.2d at 235.
271. See Stanson, 551 P.2d at 11.
272. See id.

273. See id.
274. 98 A.2d 673 (N.J. 1953).
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advantages and disadvantages of a proposal.275 In the case, the defendant school
board claimed it was acting pursuant to its statutory authority to build, enlarge, or
repair schoolhouses when it put out a booklet advocating building new school
facilities.27 6 The court said that spending funds on the booklet would have been
permissible, even though it was not expressly authorized under the school board's
general power, if the school board had made a fair presentation of the facts, including
the increased tax rate and other less desirable consequences.2 77 The court also noted
the coercive quality of the speech-for example, the booklet contained warnings that
voting "no" would cheat children out of their education.27 Similarly, the
advertisements in Carterrelated the advantages of the proposed utility acquisition,
without presenting the risks involved in acquiring an electric utility or the possible
alternatives to the acquisition.279
Courts do not adequately explain why express advocacy coerces the electorate any
more than other forms of speech by the government. Consider that the Commission
designed specifically for promoting equal gender rights in Miller2 "0 undoubtedly had
a profound effect on public opinion. In fact, it probably had more influence than
promotional advertisements targeted at an election. While express advocacy, such as
"vote yes," may "tend[] to supplant the critical capacity of its hearers, 2' s' a
presentation that is less strident, but uses facts favoring only its position, may be
equally or more persuasive.
The notion that maintaining the appearance of fairness is important in preserving
the integrity of the electoral process underlies the court's requirement of a fair
presentation of facts. By forbidding express advocacy, courts indicate that they view
express advocacy as more harmful to the machinery of government than presenting
facts in a way favorable to the government's view. Government stability and
legitimacy is largely dependent on public perception, and our society expects the
government to remain impartial at least with respect to electoral matters.
VI. CONCLUSION
ethically questionable conduct of a New Mexico
fore
the
Carterbrought to the
municipality. As one court addressing the issue of government partisan advocacy
admonished, when scrutinizing whether government partisan advocacy poses a
serious problem, "'unconstitutional practices (often) get their first footing' in their

275. See id. at 677.
276. See id. at 674.
277. See id. at 677.
278. See id.
279. For the advertisement entitled "Pull the Plug on Rumors and Misinformation," see Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, Exhibit D at 000026, Carter v. City of Las Cruces, 121 N.M. 580, 915
P.2d 336 (Ct. App.) (No. CV-94-605), cert. denied, 121 N.M. 644, 916 P.2d 844 (1996). In oral argument, the City
claimed that its advertisement was a neutral presentation of both sides of the issue. See Transcript of Proceedings at
42-43, Carter v. City of Las Cruces, 121 N.M. 580, 915 P.2d 336 (Ct. App.) (No. CV-94-605), cert.denied, 121 N.M.
644, 916 P.2d 844 (1996).
280. See Miller v. California Comm'n on the Status of Women, 198 Cal. Rptr. 877 (Ct. App. 1984).
281. See Ryan, supra note 14, at 1133 n.176.

Summer 1997]

CARTER V. CITY OF LAS CRUCES

'mildest and least repulsive form."' 282 Government entities frequently attempt to
influence elections through partisan advocacy in some form, and their actions may
seem relatively harmless. Few would dispute, however, that public faith in the
integrity of the electoral process has faded in past decades. The decline in voting
since the 1960s reflects a public indifference to, and perhaps disillusionment with,
the political process. It also may reflect a feeling that participation is meaningless
because the government is increasingly dominated by other interests, such as private
corporations. 213
Courts have stated that prohibiting government partisan advocacy before an
election preserves fairness and the appearanceof fairness. However, on the one
hand, the judicial assumption that government speech is unfair because it distorts the
formation of consent conflicts with the First Amendment assumption that individuals
can recognize speech for what it is. 2 1' On the other hand, the judicial concern with
preserving the appearance of fairness acknowledges that government partisan
advocacy looks bad. Courts are not entirely exaggerating when they equate these
messages to propaganda. The uproar in Las Cruces that generated the challenge in
Carterreveals that a significant number of people were upset about the government's
expenditures.
The electoral process legitimates the government in power.285 Governmental
participation in political controversies by contentiously advocating one side of an
issue deviates from the neutral role that a government is expected to assume. It
degrades the public's perception of the government and the entire political process.
The Supreme Court has recognized a strong governmental interest in preserving the
integrity of the democratic process with laws that preserve the appearance of fairness
in our government and protect the exercise of the voting franchise.28 6
Some commentators assert that government speech has not been challenged on a
large scale because it does not present a significant enough problem and speculate
that the lack of challenges may attest to the strength of our system.7 Those who wish
to either emphasize or, conversely, devalue its implications cannot deny that speech
is a powerful tool of manipulation. However, those who consider government speech
to be only a trivial problem acknowledge that speech is as elusive as it is powerful.

282. Stanson v. Mott, 551 P.2d 1, 16 (Cal. 1976) (en banc) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616
(1886)); see also, TRIBE, supra note 57, § 12-4, at 809-10 & n.19 ("[Tihe most troubling instances of governmental
expression are often the most subtle and insidious.").
283. See Bagdikian, supra note 256, at 112 (attributing the decline in voter turnout and citizens making an
effort to vote to commercial television's political dominance beginning in 1960). "National political campaigns [have
become] ... waged mainly through ten, twenty, and thirty second commercials." Id.; see Burt v. Blumenauer, 699
P.2d 168, 175 (Or. 1975) (en banc) ("[O]ne purpose of government in our society is ... to moderate among
competing private interests and voices ....
").
284. See TRIBE, supra note 57, § 12-4, at 809 n.16; see also Schauer, supra note 8, at 381-82.
285. See Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Marketing Justice, THE NEw YORKER, Feb. 24, 1997, at 11. "Does anybody
imagine that we have free elections because they yield the best policies?" Id. Gates, in a critique of the jury system
that is relevant to the electoral system, asserts that "jury service represents the one chance most citizens ever get to
perform a substantive government function." Id.
286. See Burson v. Freedman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992).
287. See generally Tushnet, supranote 57, at 134 ("[IThe degree of pluralism in the United States means that
substantive government speech is not a real problem. In most situations there are opponents and critics who have
enough access to the means of communication to assure that no substantive speech will be so loud as to drown out
opposition.").
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Having courts determine the difference between neutral factual information and
biased persuasion leaves them with the task of making arbitrary distinctions and
perhaps invites manipulation of the standards. It also ignores First Amendment
concerns with vagueness and the tendency of all forms of communications, whether
covert or overt, to sway public opinion.
First Amendment decisions promote more speech as the most feasible and
288
effective means of insuring a government that derives its power from the people.
Eliminating government partisan advocacy, assuming a prohibition is workable, may
promote the integrity of the democratic process by requiring the government to
remain impartial with electoral matters to aid the public's perception. However,
prohibiting government partisan advocacy under the assumption that it poses a
serious threat to the political process belies the First Amendment premise that the
public can evaluate for themselves the merits of opposing arguments.
LEIGH CONTRERAS

288. See Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375,389 (1962)("Under our system of government, counterargument and
education are the weapons available to expose these matters, not abridgement ...of free speech ...").

